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
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Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

VOL. 1, NUMBER 13

BEOGRAD, NOVEMBER 22, 1950

Our Road (BY JOSEF SCHAPPE)

Complications in Korea

FROM THE UNO:

For Real Suppression of Aggression or for Purposes of Propaganda?

An Eloquent Silence

EDITORIAL COMMENTS:

Soviet Union Places the German Problem in the Foreground

Yugoslav — Greek Relations

After the Elections to the U. S. Congress

The Anxieties of the European Payments Union

Sheffield — Warsaw

LIFE IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA:

Workers' Councils in Action

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA:

Effect Precedes Cause by Five Months

EDITORS: DUSHAN TIMOTIYEVICH AND ZDRAVKO PECHAR

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
NOT DETACH



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Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THIS MAGAZINE IS A FREE FORUM
AND PUBLISHES THE OPINIONS OF
LOCAL AND FOREIGN WRITERS ON
VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
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THE CALCULUS



'OUR COMPUTATIONS UNERRINGLY PROVE THAT THE
YUGOSLAV 24-HOURS' CEASE-FIRE LIMIT IS FAR LONGER
THAN OUR 14-DAY ONE.'

("Jež" — Beograd)

Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

EDITORIAL COMMENT

COMPLICATIONS IN KOREA

BE they volunteers or regular troops, the Chinese are warring against McArthur's forces in North Korea. This realisation surely could please no one who truly means peace when talking about it, and none of those who are able to distinguish the dove of peace from the Sheffield-Warsaw variety of migrant duck.

The question of whether volunteers are involved or not is really irrelevant to the issue. Even the Peking Government itself would not be likely to deny that it had been responsible for equipping, arming and transporting the Chinese forces which are in Korea. As for the public collections of funds in China for the purchase of arms and equipment, this, at best, could only have the effect of relieving the Peking National Bank in view of all that material being produced in government factories and not being available for free sale.

In any case, the problem involved in Korea today is not of a type to be settled by means of juristic juggling. Both the United Nations and the whole world are confronted by an eminently political problem, whose implications far transcend the bounds of Korea, and even the Far East itself as a determinate portion of the globe.

Approaching the problem of the presence of Chinese troops in Korea from that standpoint, we firstly have to pose the question as to why it came to Chinese intervention only in November, and not sooner? Why, for example, did China serenely

watch the vain and costly, desperate campaign of the North Koreans against the Pusan bridgehead? Why did Peking allow that the main body of Kim Il Sen's troops, equipped by the Russians, be first smashed?

Although fully reliable answers to these and similar questions are not within easy reach, one thing remains certain — Peking has been visibly restraining itself from getting directly involved in the Korean conflict.

The motives which finally led the Mao Tse-Tung Government to take active part in this conflict may vary. Regardless of the degree of Moscow influence in the matter, the crossing of the 38th Parallel was bound to arouse Peking's anxiety. The crossing into North Korea brought McArthur's troops on the threshold of Manchuria, i. e. a zone of momentous interest to China from the political, strategic and economic angle.

It is hard to presume that China's sole reason for intervention was to safeguard the hydro-electric stations on the Yalu river, although this factor too certainly played an important part. However, judging by front-line reports, the activity of the Chinese forces seems to have been restricted to a relatively narrow zone along the Korean-Manchurian border. This would suggest that not even the Peking Government is set on having the conflict spread, and that the move is in the line of a political action rather than a full-scale armed interference in the fighting in Korea.

This also appears to be the view

taken by the big Western powers of the newly-created situation, if one is to go by the declarations made in the Security Council and elsewhere. This kind of both-sided reaction to the course of operations in Korea therefore leaves the way open to restrict the conflict to that territory alone and to bring it to a close through negotiations in Lake Success, where the representatives of the Peking Government are also due shortly.

However, the attitude of Moscow has to be reckoned with as well. Failure in Korea so far has cost the USSR appreciably in prestige. The liquidation of the conflict by way of a compromise, attained largely owing to pressure exerted by the presence of the Chinese in the frontier region, could serve to enhance the prestige of China, but could hardly boost USSR influence in Korea or China.

It should cause no surprise, hence, if the recognition of Chinese interests in the border region, primarily of China's right to the utilization of electric current from power stations located on both sides of the frontier, should fail to meet with enthusiastic reception in Moscow. This might lead to fresh complications, the first omen of which occurs in the negative attitude of the Soviet delegation toward the resolution guaranteeing China's interests in the frontier zone.

The United Nations Organization will, nevertheless, be in a position to overcome these complications for the Soviet Union's attitude is evi-

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dently not backed by a resoluteness for direct intervention by the Soviet Army. The threats of obstructionism in UNO will surely impress no one after all the experience had so far in that direction, and the fact of the USSR being primarily responsible for the outbreak of the armed conflict in Korea is evident.

Far more serious is the question as to what sort of situation will arise if it really comes to the creation of a special buffer-zone between Korea and China. In that respect history has shown the solving of disputes by means of artificial buffer territories to serve only for the postponement of conflicts, or rather to act as a constant source of new friction.

In the case of Korea the method could lead to the setting up of a new demarcation line to replace the former one (38th Parallel) and to the revival, in a fresh guise, of the identical situation which led up to the conflict along the 38th Parallel in the first place.

That, in effect, would be tantamount to the solving of the Korean question not on the basis of that country's unity and independence, but on the basis of a new division of spheres of influence in Korea, with China being brought into it on top of USSR on this occasion.

It was evidently not the wisest of decisions to confront the United Nations with such a situation in which the simplest way of escape is to liquidate an old problem by creating a new and equally hard one. That decision, however, had in its essence been brought already then when the troops of General MacArthur received orders to cross the 38th Parallel without a previous mature settlement of the fundamental political question of the future of Korea.

The hopes cherished then in the circles which forced that decision, to the effect that it would lead to the rapid termination of hostilities in Korea, have since proved without foundation. A duplication of this mistake by the reckless forcing of a purely military decision fortunately no longer seems probable. The chief danger lies in the possibility

of a revival of spheres of influence, separated by a new demarcation line.

Today, just like then, although it might prove harder to effect now, a way out of this situation should evidently be sought by meeting the aspirations of the Korean people for unity and independence, duly guaranteed by the authority of the United Nations. This is all the more important in view of the over-all tense situation in East Asia, and its being pregnant with different threats of conflict. This tension could only be relieved by scrapping the perilous idea that the peoples of Asia can be treated like objects of a policy of spheres of influence.

Yugoslav - Greek Relations

THE deadlock on the question of establishment of normal relations between Greece and Yugoslavia seems to have been broken by the formation of the new Greek Government without Tsaldaris' Populists. The absence of normal relations between the two neighboring states is harmful for both sides so that any step directed at changing this state of affairs can only be welcomed as being in the interests of international cooperation and peace in this part of the world. The Yugoslavs have for this reason not ceased their efforts in this direction although, unfortunately, they have not met with understanding on the other side.

Yugoslavia's goodwill to have the question of normal relations solved constructively is testified to, apart from other things, by its decision to effect the repatriation of 57 members of the Greek armed forces who had, for various reasons, crossed over into Yugoslav territory where they were interned. A large section of the Greek press hailed this Yugoslav decision as a manifestation of its goodwill and a step toward the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Greek Premier, Mr. Venizelos, also made a statement to this effect. However, certain newspapers, while commenting favorably upon the repatriation, printed cer-

tain inaccuracies, saying that it was not only members of the Greek armed forces who were being repatriated but "hostages", or "civilians" who had supposedly been apprehended from Greek territory. This report about hostages and civilians is an invented one. There are no such persons on Yugoslav territory nor have there been any. The repatriates are exclusively members of the Greek armed forces, 57 persons in all, and include only those who expressed the wish to return to Greece. Those who did not desire to return have remained in Yugoslavia where they are living as free citizens.

Yugoslavia has also shown its desire to improve its relations with Greece by undertaking the necessary measures to accelerate the execution of the General Assembly resolution regarding the repatriation of Greek children. At the initiative of the Yugoslav Red Cross, the International Red Cross — which is the medium through which the repatriation of the Greek children is to be effected — sent a representative to Athens to collect on the spot the applications of the parents of the Greek children and all the other necessary documents which it will then turn over to the Yugoslav Red Cross representative in Greece. In this manner, it will be possible to repatriate the first group of 63 Greek children whose parents, according to the documents collected, are in Greece.

The Yugoslav public received with satisfaction the news about the readiness of Greece to make it possible for goods for Yugoslavia to go through the port of Salonika. (There were similar arrangements for the transport of goods when Yugoslavia was receiving UNRRA supplies in 1945.)

This fact demonstrates that Greece is beginning to approach the question of establishment of normal relations with Yugoslavia in a spirit of greater understanding. This will undoubtedly benefit both countries and make it possible for them to cooperate fruitfully in the economic field.

Soviet Union Places the German Problem in the Foreground

At a moment when Chinese units have put in an appearance in Korea and when the tension in Southeast Asia is approaching its peak, the USSR has unexpectedly attempted to place the problem of Germany in the foreground. Soviet Under-Secretary of State, Gromyko, on the third of this month, proposed a four-power foreign ministers' conference to the USA, Great Britain and France for the purpose of holding talks on Germany. At the same time, he presented the platform for the talks — the "peace-loving solution of the German problem."

This Soviet note was actually given in official form in the October Prague statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Eastern European countries. This was mainly a Soviet propaganda move aimed at diverting the attention of the world public from events in the Far East and covering up the failure of the obstructionist Soviet policy in the UNO. Simultaneously, the aim of this Soviet proposal was to introduce the greatest possible confusion among the Western powers now when they are considering the question of rearmament of Germany.

Official and political circles in the West gave this Soviet proposal a cool reception. By and large, they agree in their opinion that this meeting between the four Foreign Ministers would be beneficial but they have very little hope as to the achievement of positive results. The reason for this is that the USSR has so far systematically obstructed the talks on Austria, whose problems are far simpler than those of Germany. At the same time, these circles emphasize that at all conferences so far the USSR has not made any concessions at its own expense in the interests of regulating international and inter-allied relations. It is considered that the Soviet initiative should be taken up insofar as it shows a real desire to come to an understanding.

Judging from past experience with the USSR and from the policy which the forces of occupation are pursuing in Germany — every one doing what is in their own interest — there is no sincere wish to come to an understanding on anyone's part.

It is most probable that the Soviet Union is seeking a pretext for a meeting of Foreign Ministers in order to get something for itself outside of the scope of the German problem, adhering to its conception that various problems should be considered by the big powers alone, outside of and by-passing the UNO. If nothing else, it is probably meant to have a certain propaganda effect, to serve as an injection of fresh blood to the anaemic Soviet peace propaganda and the hypocritical policy of discrepancies between words and deeds. Regardless of the decisions of the big powers in the West, who also look at things from their own angles, even if there is a meeting between their Foreign Secretaries and the Soviet Foreign Minister, there will be no real results. No side will renounce its own interests in Germany. And in that case, even if the Western powers agree to a meeting, it will take place, as all the previous ones have done, without any direct effect on a change of destiny for the German people.

Sheffield — Warsaw

DISCUSSING the preparations for the Sheffield—Warsaw Congress, which was held recently, the Soviet press termed the preparations as the greatest epic fight for peace ever recorded in the history of mankind. To those high-sounding words (we leave to the appraisal of each individual as to how far they actually concur with the true position) were added others dealing with the further tasks of the Congress (normal custom would require the tasks of different organizations to be proclaimed during the actual congresses — and not beforehand). Such further tasks also include those well-known ones like: "The ceaseless unmasking of the propagators of a new war",

"their being taken to task", etc., etc. Adding to this the slogan from Sheffield: "Any war propaganda should be prohibited", a picture is obtained which should be portraying in full the peace-loving intentions of the sponsors and organizers of the Congress. Moreover, all this could be somehow passed off on uninformed, well-meaning people, and they might be called upon to adopt such slogans as the only possible platform in the struggle for peace. But this "epic fight for peace" has again shown in recent days that it carries the seal of hypocrisy and falsehood, and deliberate malevolence, which again precludes it once and for all from speaking in the name of those principles on which the organization of the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace had been founded.

It again took the Yugoslav men to point out the character of that activity, men who, some days before the opening of the Congress in Warsaw, at the plenary meeting of the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of Peace, called world attention to the factors which should not and must not be overlooked in discussing those people who are straining themselves to represent Picasso's dove shut in the cage of Soviet hegemonistic policy as a pretty and endearing symbol of peace.

The Yugoslavs, who for two and a half years have been exposed to an unheard of campaign of intimidation and sabre rattling on their frontiers, declared at the peak of that "method of persuasion" (in July this year) that they would "never take up arms as an instrument of their national policy, except in self-defence". In order to convince the world that their peace-loving words were not out of step with their deeds, the Yugoslavs applied to all the peace-loving organizations in the world, among them also to the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace, to send their representatives to Yugoslavia to satisfy themselves on the spot about the untruthfulness and falsity of the charges ad-

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vanced by the Cominform governments and their propaganda to the effect that Yugoslavia was preparing a war of aggression against her neighbours and the USSR. Numerous organizations and individuals responded to this invitation, and they established the true state of affairs in Yugoslavia. And those who at the time were engaged in the "epic struggle for peace" did not respond to the invitation, allowing the world instead to go on being intimidated through their propaganda machine by allegations of Yugoslav preparations for the provoking of a war in Europe. By allowing such activity they were responsible for the World Congress of Defenders of Peace falling in line with the same elements which are busy fostering an activity which threatened world peace. Rather than opposing the hegemonistic policy of the USSR Government, which stops at no means to force Yugoslavia to renounce her national and political independence, the Congress of the Defenders of Peace proceeds to sustain the war psychosis in the world and the lie that Yugoslavia was the alleged country which is threatening other countries. The best answer to this type of their "peace-loving activity", "such as had never before been recorded in the history of mankind" — as the Soviet press ventured to describe it — came from the Yugoslav men through the words of the distinguished author, Miroslav Krleža, who said at the meeting of Yugoslav Fighters for Peace:

"Our message to that peace congress (to the gentlemen in Warsaw), at which our death is a subject of discussion, the message of a socialist country which has no cause whatever to go to war (because by its own sanguinary and hard struggle it had ensured all the prerequisites to overcome its backwardness and poverty, the heritage of a six-year war) is that that slogan of theirs about our war preparations is an internationally established lie."

After the Elections to the U. S. Congress

THE successes scored by the Republicans in the November 7 elections were not entirely unexpected. That the votes of the ruling party should suffer in the "off-year" elections, when the issue is not dominated by the election of the future President, is almost a normal phenomenon. In the American system, where the outcome of the off-year Congressional elections does not engender a change of government, the latter not being politically responsible to the Congress, the voters express their criticism of the government by casting their ballots for the opposition, without at the same time endangering the government's survival. It is probable that many of those who voted against the government on November 7 would not have done so had the Presidential Election been involved where the fate of the government is decided. The off-year elections, therefore, often have the meaning of a warning to the government and serve as a useful corrective of the latter's activity. Nevertheless, this does not minimize the significance of the Republican Party's success.

The election results indubitably mean a stronger stimulus and support of a more resolute foreign policy in the Far East and of greater participation by the Republican Party in the formulating of that policy. They will certainly reinforce the position of those who favour the strengthening and re-militarization of Germany and Japan. Further, the new Congress will undoubtedly be more restrained in granting credits in aid of different countries, e. g. the Marshall Plan, the rearmament of European countries, etc. This applies more particularly to assistance to the countries of Western Europe, which will be required in the future to invest greater effort in the direction of self-aid and to agree to bigger sacrifices in connection with armaments and to concessions to American demands, e. g. regarding Germany. Many people

are hoping, though, that such reductions in U. S. aid would not substantially affect American participation in the humanitarian actions being implemented through UNO or through bilateral agreements.

The prospects for any major re-orientation of American policy seem to be non-existent, however. The differences between the Government and the opposition do not enter into the essence of the aims pursued by American policy on a world plane, nor do they concern the American policy towards UNO and in UNO, or armaments. The disagreements are primarily confined to the sphere of tactics and methods to be employed for the attainment of such aims and the accents to be given to the various aspects of American policy. On the other hand, the election results do not force the government to make essential concessions. The Democratic Party has kept a majority in Congress, although a considerably reduced one. The opposition, on the other hand, has neither the strength nor the unity to be able to impose its will and views. It is most probable therefore that a compromise would be found for the consolidation of the same bi-partisan policy, which had been so far basically pursued. In this connection, it might be pointed at the Republican demands for the resignation of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. There are no indications, however, that this might happen in the immediate future. At any rate, an eventual change in the State Department would not signify also a change of U. S. A. foreign policy.

Viewed from the angle of internal affairs, though, the election results mean that some fundamental points of the "Fair Deal", President Truman's social programme, will have to be abandoned, and that more stringent measures of economy and in administrative expenditure, and against "communists and their fellow travellers", as the members of leftist and progressive organizations generally are termed in U. S. A., will also be introduced.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Anxieties of the European Payments Union

It took six weeks for the results to be published after the actual closing of the first audit in the life of the European Payments Union. Whence so much mystery regarding the Union's statement of accounts? It is probably due to the desire to avoid the consequences of the publication of the unexpectedly high deficits of individual countries before decisions had been made for the removal of the resultant derangements. The initiators of the Payments Union plan were not expecting the earmarked credits to become exhausted within a mere period of three months and that deficits would ensue which automatically entail payments in gold or in dollars for all future procurements.

The entire mechanism for the equalization of payments balances of the Union's members has been seriously shaken already at this first periodic accounting. The reasons for this ought to be sought only partially in the quotas (the loan limits for individual members and their credit commitments toward the Union respectively), which had been set too low for some countries. It is to be emphasized that, for the sake of liberalization of import trade — which obligation is assumed at the very joining of the Union — a number of countries had to open their frontiers to the import of foreign goods, and that in proportions which could not be even imagined if these goods had to be paid in foreign exchange. The functioning of the Union, including the utilization of considerable credits, has made possible an increase in the imports of all those countries which, owing to the lack of foreign exchange, had previously been unable to obtain the required supplies in sufficient quantities. Cognizant, as far back as July, i. e. at the start of the Union's operations, that the prices of key commodities would inevitably mark a constant upward trend, many

countries took maximum advantage of the Union mechanism for the purchase of large quantities of merchandise. In this fashion, they were able to cover also many of their future needs, and to avoid later buying of indispensable raw materials at higher prices. This has placed them in the position of debtors toward the Union who had completely exhausted their determinate quotas. In effect, such countries have been financing their current and future import requirements at the expense of the other Union members, who in their turn became large creditors of the Union.

At its November session, the Administrative Board of the Union was due to resolve this crisis in its mechanism, that is, to settle the position of such members who could no longer benefit by the multi-lateral transfer because of having to pay for any future imports in gold or in dollars. The choice lay between two alternatives: either to raise their quotas (credits), or to see them leave the Union. It appears that the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation will adopt the proposal of the Union's Administrative Board for increased credits so as to ensure the continued functioning of the system of inter-European payments, subject, however, to the countries granted increased quotas undertaking certain determinate measures.

Judging by everything, the first obstacles encountered by the Payments Union have strongly shaken this institution in which its founders had vested such great hopes. This initial crisis seems to have been weathered, at the cost, however, of direct control and interference by OEEC in the internal affairs of the countries scheduled to be granted fresh quotas. The reasons underlying the unusual and protracted postponement of the publication of the Union's balance sheet for the first quarter are hence not quite devoid of significance.

A Justified Measure of the Yugoslav Government

Due to the application of terror and pressure against the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Albania, and the restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement and personal liberty, the functioning of the Yugoslav legation in Tirana had been made impossible for over six months now, as a result of which Yugoslavia had been placed in an unreciprocal position in relation to Albania. At the same time, the Albanian legation in Beograd had been converted from a diplomatic institution into a plain instrument of the unpacific and provocative policy of the Albanian Government toward Yugoslavia.

For these reasons, and after the Albanian legation in Beograd had returned, on October 28, without motivation, the Yugoslav Government Note of Protest dated October 22, concerning the armed attack (on October 12 this year) by Albanian frontier forces against Yugoslav frontier guards, which led to the serious wounding and subsequent death of the Yugoslav frontier guard, Milorad Djurić, the Yugoslav Government, on November 11 this year, communicated to the Albanian Government that it considered the further stay of the Albanian representatives in Yugoslavia as superfluous.

The news reports and comments which appeared in the world press in that connection referred to the severing of diplomatic relations with Albania, which, however, is incorrect. In its Note the Yugoslav Government expressed its readiness to maintain further diplomatic contact through its legation in Budapest. The abstention from the severance of diplomatic relations in this situation is in fact a fresh proof of the patience and pacifism of the Yugoslav Government. For, in order to grasp what it amounted to, and still does, to maintain diplomatic contact with the Albanian Government, it is necessary to know that it involves correspondence with such state functionaries who in their notes adhere to a vocabulary hither-

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to unknown in diplomatic correspondence, including such samples as "cannibalistic regime", "gangster act", "fascist act", "an act of Trotskyist banditism", etc., etc.

It was the Albanian Government itself which by displaying so far in a whole series of moves towards Yugoslavia that it was not anxious about the normalization of relations with the latter, or the resolving of disputed questions — all of which originate from the Albanian side — actually caused the further functioning of its representation in Beograd to become superfluous. And that this course of action strained the relations with Yugoslavia ever more cannot be disguised by any phraseology of the Cominform press, which endeavours to portray the chief culprit — the Enver Hoxha government — as some alleged victim, one whose lot it was to have Yugoslavia even sever diplomatic relations with it. But this attempt only serves to show that press as having again been indulging in the distortion of obvious facts.

The End of an Unsuccessful Manoeuvre

ON November 8, the world press carried a brief, scarcely visible item: The representative of the USSR had returned without any motivation to the session of the Allied Council for Japan.

It was on January 18th this year that the news was published of General Deveryenko, representing the USSR in the Allied Council for Japan, having left a meeting of this body in protest against the placing on the agenda of the question of repatriation of Japanese POW's from the Soviet Union.

This demonstration is now over, the representative of USSR is back in the Council and — just as the exit from the Council had been unprincipled, so was the return to it unglorious and unprincipled. The Soviet press has been silent on the subject, tarrying as usual to report on failures in the USSR's foreign political manoeuvres which have been multiplying in the past few years.

Motives of the Currency Reform in Poland

THE official statement about the currency reform in Poland is primarily designed as propaganda for the people inside the country. It does not speak at all about the real motives and aims of that reform. This statement is characteristic only in that it brings the reform into direct association with the plan, which, — by an order from Moscow — had to be subjected recently to a radical change.

The currency reform was carried out for reasons which are really of an internal and external nature.

One of the primary internal reasons was the checking of excessive inflation; confiscation of money from the hands of those who acquired it under conditions favourable for speculation; and to again establish the balance between the monetary and the goods funds. The unfavourable ratio between these two funds began to deteriorate very rapidly after Poland terminated the ration card system. This measure was represented as one of the greatest successes of its economic policy. From that day onwards prices began to rise higher and higher, and on the markets there were less and less goods. There arose insurmountable obstacles in the supply of goods for the people, and Poland had to return soon to some sort of rationing cards for supplying the workers at least with the basic necessities. With this measure, the difficulties with supplies were not solved. On the contrary, they were growing, and the purchasing power of workers' wages was declining. So now the question arises, is the working class of Poland going to gain any advantage from this currency reform? Or whether, and to what extent, shall the relation of prices and wages result — after the reform — in a rise of the purchasing power of the workers? The manner of currency reform, as it was defined, does not change the previous relationship of prices and wages.

After the currency exchange is carried out, the purchasing power

of wages shall remain unaltered provided the prices of certain products do not rise or if the state taxes and dues are not increased.

As regards the capitalist world, the currency reform will not have any significance. From now on, as before, capitalist countries will not trade with Poland on the basis of the zloty but on the basis of the dollar. The internal rate of the dollar for the zloty shall not have any influence on the exchange relations between Poland and the foreign countries.

However, there is a matter concerning which the statement makes no mention. That is the relationship of Poland and the Soviet Union in the sphere of the payments and currency exchange in general. It is certain that this transference of the zloty on a gold standard and the establishment of its parity with the rouble is neither accidental nor without significance. It is the first change of this kind in the Soviet bloc. It should be kept in mind that Poland is the first country which, after the revaluation of the rouble, began to report the value of its foreign trade in roubles. Now, it is the first to establish the parity between its currency and the rouble. It is true that the exchange between Poland and the Soviet Union is conducted on the basis of world prices, and that it is immaterial in which currency these prices are reported. In such a case the currency reform need not signify any modification in the sphere of trade exchange. But it is certain that it represents one of the further elements in the plan "for unification", i. e. subjugation. It represents one of the moves — neither the first, nor the last — for strengthening the Soviet hegemony and the exploitation and subjugation of Poland and the growing loss of Poland's independence. At any rate, the motives which determined the character of the present currency reform in Poland were by no means of a secondary nature.

OUR ROAD

By Josef SCHAPPE

That the influence of the Communist Party of Germany is decreasing steadily is a fact that can be observed every day. The working class, and the working people of the decisive industrial regions on the Rhine and in the Ruhr have, to a certain extent, turned their backs on this Party. The leadership of the Party attempts to interpret this by saying that the 12-year rule of fascism dulled the class consciousness of the German proletariat, but such an explanation is not in the least satisfactory. The very fact that the influence of the Communist Party was much greater in 1946-47 than it is now shows the untenability of such a lukewarm excuse. Apart from this, in recent months we have been able to note an increase in the class consciousness of the working class in Germany, especially among the construction workers, which found obvious expression during the strikes of workers employed along the inland waterways.

What are the reasons which led hundreds of thousands of German workers to turn their backs on their Party? Why did tens of thousands of old working class functionaries leave the Communist Party of Germany, a Party for which they had often languished in prisons and concentration camps? Why does the youth no longer have faith in the Party which the immortal Karl Liebknecht founded? The leadership of the German Communist Party will never answer these questions. It dares not approach these delicate questions with socialist arguments. But we must do so because we are socialists and because the rehabilitation of the socialist working class movement in Germany requires a squaring of accounts with the harmful relics dating from the past.

After 1945, when the Soviet Army became a force of occupation in Germany, when certain regions in Germany were wrested away by force and annexed to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Poland, it was clear to many communists that the policy of the Soviet Union could not longer be brought into accord with the principles of Lenin, for Lenin had sought peace without annexations and tributes and explicitly established that only imperialist powers indulge in the grabbing of another's territory. In addition to this, the Soviet Union's ruthless and raw occupation and reparations policies ruined all the hopes of socialistically-inclined people. Erroneous principles applied in their own Soviet territory now began to be imple-

mented in Germany, too. Walter Uhlbricht and his friends took orders which were ruthlessly carried out in Germany. The recognition of the Oder-Niese boundary line by the leadership of the United Socialist Party of Germany, the elimination of factory councils in the Russian Zone of Occupation, the holding of public elections in which candidates were not nominated in a democratic manner, the imprisoning of hundreds of old, tried and true working class functionaries who had expressed doubts in the correctness of such methods, the application of purely fascist methods to stifle all criticism — all this succeeded in creating the quiet of the tomb in the Eastern Zone of Germany and threatened to wreck the socialist movement in Germany.

Soviet leaders in Berlin — in Karlhorst, sought that the leadership of the United Socialist Party and the Communist Party of Germany implement a policy corresponding to the political concepts of their own bureaucratic caste. They regard the German Democratic Republic as some sort of state and country subjected to their will, having only to fulfil the tasks set by the Soviet bureaucracy. The relationship between the Soviet leaders and the Secretariat of the United Socialist Party and the Party leadership of the German Communist Party is that of master and servant. The working class has seen through this apathetic subordination to the orders of a foreign Government apparatus, which had heretofore been unrecorded in the German working class movement; it has perceived its harmful effects and rejected it.

Taking the big landed estates from their owners and the power from the big capitalists was not the work of the German working class. These measures were put through by order of the Soviet occupation organs, and the German working class was not, nor did it dare to be, an active factor in this process, which means that Russian patterns were used in Germany. The socialists, however, could not but know that the emancipation of the proletariat from exploitation could only be carried out by the working class itself. However, in this case it was exclusively a foreign state apparatus that was dictating its will so that the reforms carried out, especially in many areas where the big estates were divided up into small and very tiny parcels, were without a doubt not guided by socialist ideas. The founding of Soviet

stock companies was an arbitrary act by an occupation power and finally, the following must be said clearly and loudly: the working people in the German Democratic Republic can barely defend their own vital interests because the occupation authorities and a new bureaucratic machine of willing German assistants are holding the state power in their hands.

While the old reactionary forces in Western Germany — naturally not without the help of the three Western occupation powers — have regained their old political and economic power, while they have been burdening the working masses with the cost of the lost war and investing many billions in new enterprises during the last two years, while capitalism in Western Germany has been able to strengthen its positions in relation to the proletariat by force, the working class has not been in a position to organize any real resistance owing to the dependent policy of the German Communist Party leaders. The present strength of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany rests on the fact that there is no independent socialist workers' party which could hold high the principles of Marx and Engels, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and embrace the science of Lenin.

While the Social-Democratic Party is unconditionally subordinating itself to the policies of the Western powers, and Dr. Schumacher is offering some sort of economic opposition to Adenauer's Government, the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany, upon instructions from and to the advantage of its Soviet bosses, are preaching to the workers in Western Germany that they must fight together with the bourgeoisie of Western Germany in one united "National Front". It is true that the German bourgeoisie has lost its primary position in the world and on the European continent, it is true that the leading force of the imperialist states — the USA — will not stand for Germany playing the first violin in its cacophonous concert, but it is also true that in the exploitation of the Western German proletariat German monopoly capitalism is acting independently. The well-known paragraph from "The Communist Manifesto" which says that the working class must temporarily link itself to the bourgeoisie when the latter is acting in a revolutionary manner, cannot be applied to the Western German situation and to the Western German monopoly bourgeoisie. There should be no "National Front" between that bourgeoisie and the Western German working class. There must be no hypocrisy here. A clear stand must be taken and a truly socialist party in Germany must pursue a policy which will correspond to the scientific, political and cultural needs of our own country, of the German proletariat. In this connection, the need to act in

concert with the working class of the whole world must never be lost from view.

The equality of all communist parties and all socialist parties must be an irrefutable principle. No one Party must subordinate itself to the interests of some other country and it is unworthy for the Soviet representatives to control the German newspapers, maltreat their editors, appoint persons to their places who do not enjoy the confidence of the German working class but have the support of the Kremlin. On the question of the independence of Communist parties, and in no case on that question alone, we agree completely with the courageous Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The fatal course of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Germany impose upon the responsible working class functionaries in Western Germany the need to create a new socialist movement. The new independent workers' party must inherit the admirable traditions of the German workers' movement. This new Party, if it adopts the teaching of Marxism, will be free and will not subordinate itself to either the system of American monopoly capitalism or Stalin's bureaucracy. Thousands of real socialists, who were already organized in the Communist Party of Germany and the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, or even stood aside from these two traditionally working class parties, welcome our efforts aimed at creating a new working class party in Germany.

We know we shall come upon great difficulties and it really was a hard decision to take the course we chose. But we know that the Communist Party of Germany is no longer in a position to lead the proletariat owing to its absolute dependence on the Soviet apparatus. One of the most important instruments for the achievement of our goal is our socialist weekly, "Free Tribune", which renders possible lively and socialist discussions of all socialist problems and simultaneously points out the way to the workers, the way in which they can deliver themselves from misery, dependence and misfortune.

We are at the beginning, but thousands of hands are being extended to us and the socialists of all countries can be certain that the German working class is not lost. It still has enough strength to again become a powerful factor and from these columns, which were the first to allow us to offer an exposition of our views outside of the borders of Germany, we send our greetings to the communists and socialists in the whole world. I send my personal greetings to those comrades from the many countries of Europe whose fate I shared for many years in the Nazi concentration camp at Buchenwald.

FROM THE UNO

FOR REAL SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION OR FOR PURPOSES OF PROPAGANDA?

ON the 9th of this month, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted the Yugoslav Draft Resolution "on the duties of states in case of the breaking out of hostilities." According to the proposal, two states finding themselves engaged in an armed conflict must undertake all steps to bring the dispute to an end. It is the duty of that state whose armed forces crossed over into the territory of another state to declare that it will withdraw its forces and, simultaneously, to inform the UNO of this. In adopting this resolution, the United Nations have laid down the principle, stretching to any eventual cases of aggression, to the effect that the invitation for the cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of troops from alien territory shall take immediate effect, and not later than 24hrs. following the outbreak of hostilities between states. Keeping in mind the right of an attacked state to self-defense, the Resolution also provides for action by the UN Commission for the Control of Peace in case it is not already functioning at the location where the conflict has broken out.

The Soviet Delegation and the delegations of Eastern Europe under its control took advantage of the discussion preceding the adoption of the Yugoslav draft resolution to speak about the question of peace in their usual propaganda-like manner. They approached this important question for the preservation of peace and constructive international cooperation not from the angle of concrete political action which moves a cause forward and wins over people by its positive results, but for the aim of propagating their own policy. The Soviet Delegation submitted its own proposal of a "declaration to eliminate the danger of a new war and to consolidate the peace and security of peoples" only for the purpose of putting forward an antithesis to the Yugoslav Resolution.

In contrast to the Yugoslav proposal which was adopted by 51 votes in the UN, the great majority of them from small states, and which takes the interests of those states into account, the Soviet Resolution did not contain one word about the interests of the small states. On the contrary, it made mention only of the various forms of and pretexts for aggression against some state but no provision was made for measures to prevent that aggression. In enumerating the forms and protests, which was done for purely demagogic purposes, the Soviet representatives submitting the resolution avoided defining blockades by land, sea and air and economic blockades as aggression. This last is also one of the forms of pressure and aggression. They refrained from doing so because in that case the USSR would be forced to stop its current practice.

A reflection of the Soviet aspirations is contained in the criticism tendered by the delegates from the Soviet bloc of that point in the original Yugoslav proposal providing for the cessation of war operations within 24 hours after the outbreak of aggression. According to the concepts of the Soviet Delegation, this period of time was "too long."

Regardless of the fact that it had a few days earlier sought that in case of aggression a special

session of the UN General Assembly should be convened not in 24 hours but in two weeks, the Soviet Delegation made this objection! Under the present conditions of development of war technique and the balance of forces among states, the Soviet two-week period would be ample time for a big power to liquidate any small state whatsoever and to place every international forum before an accomplished fact by way of various diplomatic machinations. Keeping in mind the present policy of the USSR, it is not hard to arrive at the reason why the Soviet delegates sought a free hand for the aggressor for a full two weeks.

When it became clear that the revised text of the Yugoslav Resolution and the mechanism it provides for were really acceptable to all the UN members, the Polish delegate, on behalf of the Soviet bloc, made the observation that the Yugoslav proposal contained the "shortcoming of not referring to the duties of states before the outbreak of aggression." This he did with the aim of diverting the course of the discussion into futile channels, prolonging it and decreasing the significance of the proposed resolution.

It did not just happen in a haphazard sort of way that the Polish delegate was the one to make this illogical observation which was entirely out of place. So that the Soviet delegate would not be one of those from the Eastern European bloc who actually spreads the fear of war while speaking about peace, the Polish delegate took this duty upon himself. In referring to this "shortcoming in the Yugoslav Resolution", he delivered an address mainly about the dangers threatening the countries of people's democracy. This speech can be described only as disguised warmongering propaganda, calculated to intimidate the people in the Eastern European countries, so that they would silently and unconditionally adopt every Soviet proposal and action.

In the scope of these Soviet aspirations not only in relation to the Cominform countries but to the rest of the world as well, the Soviet counter-proposal to the Yugoslav resolution does not in essence provide any sort of guarantee against the aggressor. It is limited to a mere legal formula, without taking the substance into account, which in this case is much more important than bureaucratic forms.

Taking into consideration the state of affairs in the countries of the Eastern European bloc, the present policy of the leaders of that bloc and the stand taken by their representatives, it is not hard to see that the USSR has the intention of obstructing the work of the Political Committee and of diverting its attention from the most essential question of today — how to prevent and suppress any eventual aggression.

Thanks to the correctness and the force of the Yugoslav proposal and the understanding it met with among the majority of the delegations, the Soviet maneuver did not succeed. But it did succeed in showing that the USSR is not at all concerned with sincere international cooperation.

AN ELOQUENT SILENCE

SILENCE can sometimes actually mean silence, but it can occasionally be very eloquent. And in this silence one can either utter a truth or a lie. In connection with the article "Powerful Weapon in the Struggle for Communism", published by the "Pravda", the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on October 1st, 1950, J. V. Stalin keeps silent.

The article states inter alia:

The publication of this book by Stalin 'A Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)' represents the most important event in the ideological life of the Soviet Union and the entire world communist movement. The great victorious ideas of Marxism-Leninism, whose victories are recounted on the pages of Stalin's work...

"The victorious ideas of Marxism-Leninism"? One of the fundamental ideals of this science is the struggle for truth. But Stalin keeps absolutely silent when ascribed a work which represents the most important event in the ideological life of the Party of the Soviet Union and the entire world communist movement. And what about the "Capital" and all the other works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin? What do they represent in the struggle of the proletariat? According to the "Pravda" estimate they are undoubtedly of secondary importance. However, the silence of which we wish to speak does not refer so much to the attitude with respect to the "Pravda" estimate of the importance of the "Short Course" as to the fact that Stalin keeps silent when ascribed the merit of having written a work published a mere twelve years ago, when the history of this book is still known to many.

Propaganda in the USSR to all appearances assumes the young generation to be of very limited mental faculties, assumes that no one will even think of asking why the "Short Course", if indeed written by Stalin, was published in 1938 without his signature? Or why, instead of the name of the author, can one read on the covers of the "Short Course" that this work has been "Edited by the Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union". Or why, again, the decision of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of November 14, 1938, on the "Organization of Party Propaganda", in connection with the publication of the "Short Course", did not mention by a single word that Stalin is the author of this work? And so on and so forth. To all these questions the only answer from the USSR is — silence. E. Yaroslavsky would probably have quite a lot to say on the matter, but he too keeps silent. The motives which induce him to this are, however, not identical with those of J. V. Stalin.

Should we decide to believe the "Pravda's" assertion that the "Short Course" is the work of J. V. Stalin, we would have to pause in surprise at page 95 of this book. The author introduces himself to his readers in the following way:

At that time Comrade Stalin carried through tremendous revolutionary work in the Lower Caucasus. Comrade Stalin exposed and defeated the Mensheviks as the opponents of the Revolution and armed uprising. He prepared the workers radically for a decisive struggle against autarchy.

Truly, very "modest". But that is not the only place where we encounter such "modesty". On page 307 we come upon the following paragraph:

Of great importance for the ideological defeat of Trotskyism was the theoretical work of Comrade Stalin,

'On the Foundations of Leninism', which was published in 1924. This brochure is a masterly exposition and profoundly theoretical elaboration of Leninism. It provided and is now providing Bolsheviks throughout the world with the sharp weapon of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Other similar passages could be quoted. However, what we are dealing with here is neither modesty nor immodesty, but far graver problems. While the "Short Course" was considered the work of a commission, of which E. Yaroslavsky was also a member, it was only logical to expect that the Commission, though not stressing it explicitly, should have made use of the earlier work of its member, E. Yaroslavsky. The Commission of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party was certainly under no obligation to mention that the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)", by E. Yaroslavsky, served as a basis for the "Short Course". But since it is being asserted today that the "Short Course" is the work of J. V. Stalin and that it "represented the most important event in the ideological life of the Party of the Soviet Union and the entire world communist movement", one feels compelled, for the sake of truth, to set out the relation between the "Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)" and the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)" by E. Yaroslavsky.

The second edition of E. Yaroslavsky's "History of the CPSU (B)" was published in Moscow in 1934. The first edition of the "Short Course" was published in 1938, likewise in Moscow.

Two books can be compared in general outlines and in details. We shall begin with the particular and proceed to the general. Are there any similarities in the details? Yaroslavsky's "History" and the "Short Course" contain passages which refer to the same period of time and which read as follows:

E. Yaroslavsky: —

The Moscow uprising was suppressed regardless of all the heroism displayed by the insurgent workers.

The Moscow uprising was not isolated. Revolutionary uprisings spread to a series of other towns and regions. Armed uprisings broke out in Krasnoyarsk, Molotovsk, Novorossiysk, Sevastopol, Kronstadt. Especially tenacious struggles were waged in the Baltic region (Latvia), in Georgia, and in the region of the Yekaterinoslavskaya railway.

How did the Bolsheviks judge this uprising, and how the Mensheviks?

The Menshevik Plekhanov after the uprising rebuked the Party: "One should not have taken to arms... They (the Mensheviks) in all possible ways belittled the significance of the uprising and mocked it, endeavouring to prove in all possible ways that the course of uprising was a hopeless utopian course of struggle".

The Bolsheviks did not take this attitude to the uprising. For them the test of the Moscow uprising only confirmed the possibility of a successful struggle of the working class... To Plekhanov's rebuke "One should not have taken to arms", Lenin replied: "On the contrary, one should have done so more decisively..."

The "Short Course": —

The Moscow uprising was suppressed.

The uprising did not restrict itself to Moscow alone. Revolutionary uprisings spread to a series of other towns and regions. Armed uprisings broke out in Krasnoyarsk, Molotovsk (Perm), Novorossiysk, Samov, Sevastopol, Kronstadt.

The oppressed peoples of Russia also rose to arms. The uprising spread to almost the whole of Georgia. An uprising of bigger proportions broke out in the Ukraine, in the Donbas: in Gorlovka, Alexandrovsk, Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad). The struggle in Latvia was of a tenacious character...

The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks judged the December armed uprising in different ways.

The Menshevik Plekhanov after the uprising rebuked the Party "One should not have taken to arms". The Mensheviks endeavoured to prove that the uprising was

unnecessary and harmful, that one could switch over to a revolution without uprisings, that success could not be attained by means of armed uprisings, but by peaceful means of struggle.

The Bolsheviks branded such an attitude as traitorous. They considered that the Moscow uprising had only confirmed the possibility of an armed struggle of the working class. To Plekhanov's rebuke "One should not have taken to arms," Lenin replied "On the contrary, one should have done so more decisively...."

And one can thus read through the entire "History". To each page one can find a corresponding text—somewhat altered in some places, textually copied in others. There is no need to prove that this is impermissible, all the more so when one omits to mention the source which has been made use of in the work.

And when this is how matters stand with the details, what are we to say of the whole. An experienced reader who is interested in certain problems starts by reading the contents of a book. If we take a look at how E. Yaroslavsky laid out his book, and then cast a glance at the "Short Course", we shall immediately be able to establish that what we have before us are two variations of one and the same plan. (Many of the chapters of the "Short Course" have exactly the same titles as the chapters of Yaroslavsky's "History of the CPSU (B)").

The "Short Course", written later, has in every respect gone a step further ahead from E. Yaroslavsky's History—both in a positive and negative respect. The connections between the CPSU (B) and the other parties in the world are far more emphasized in Yaroslavsky's book than they are in the "Short Course". Yaroslavsky, in 1934, as literature for different chapters—for the part up to Lenin's death—quoted Lenin almost exclusively. The "Short Course", true enough, quotes no literature for the

different chapters, but displays many odd symptoms. Thus, for example, in the part dealing with the October Revolution, Stalin is placed on an equal footing with Lenin. The glorification of Stalin has become a permanent process. The Soviet propaganda in a roundabout way glorifies Stalin as one of the founders of the Bolshevik Party. In the "Pravda" and elsewhere, Stalin has been proclaimed the author of the "Short Course", and moreover the "Pravda" article with which we are dealing does not stop at this assertion only. The article also asserts that:

Historical experience and implementation have confirmed the theory of Lenin-Stalin on the victory of socialism in one separate country, on the Soviets as the best form of the political organization of society in the transition period from capitalism to socialism, on the Party as the guiding and channelling force in the system of the working class-leaders and the organizers of the masses in the struggle for communism.

Whom is one to believe? The "Pravda" article or the "Short Course"? On the theoretical premises which the "Pravda", as we have shown above, ascribes, in addition to Lenin, also to J. V. Stalin, the "Short Course" says the following:

On the grounds of all this Lenin came to the conclusion that it is perfectly possible for the proletariat to force the imperialist front anywhere, in one place or in several places, that the victory of socialism is possible, first in several countries, or even in one separate one...

Lenin announced this premise in an article entitled "On the Slogan of the United States of Europe", published in August 1915. The "Short Course" does not by a single word mention Stalin as being the author of this theory.

On the other theoretical premise, which refers to the Soviets, the "Short Course" says:

The Revolution of 1905 showed that the Soviets are the bodies of an armed uprising and at the same time the seeds of new, revolutionary government. The idea of the Soviets lived in the consciousness of the working masses, and they realized it on the morrow of the overthrow of tsarism....

Thus, here, too, there is no question of a theoretical premise which Stalin laid down together with Lenin. On the third premise, namely, on the Party being the guiding force, the "Short Course" says:

Lenin more than forty years ago (today more than fifty years ago) correctly pointed out the course of the struggle of the working class, determined its role as that of a guiding revolutionary force of society, determined the role of the peasantry as that of the allies of the working class.

Lenin worked out the whole of his theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat alone, using the works of Marx and Engels. That is what we are also told by Stalin in his book "Questions of Leninism".

And to all this J. V. Stalin is silent, silent and approving. But that will not make lies turn into truth. And neither will the assertion that Stalin is the author of the "Short Course" actually make him become this. The Soviet propaganda has resorted to this unworthy trick in order to help in the efforts to raise Stalin to the pedestal of Divinity—as idolatry corresponds to the system of bureaucracy.¹⁾

The process is developing. But parallel to it develops the consciousness of the millions of the people, who will once ask that this silence cease and that they be told the truth about many matters.

Sima KARAOGLANOVITCH



Vasa POMORIŠAC: STRAHINIĆ BAN (Drawing)

1) We shall give a small example: in its efforts to present J. V. Stalin's theoretical work greater than it actually is, the Soviet propaganda has resorted to such naive means as to publish V. I. Lenin's and J. V. Stalin's works in the same form, at first glance. However, while 16 pages of Lenin's work have 37,600 typographical signs, the same number of pages in Stalin's works have only 25,600 signs. A text of the same length when printed under Lenin's name makes two and under Stalin's name, three volumes.

LIFE IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

WORKERS' COUNCILS IN ACTION

THERE exists a comprehensible interest abroad, especially among workers, in connection with the activities and organization of the Yugoslav Workers' Councils and their Managing Boards. They represent a new, revolutionary phenomenon along the line of consistent application of the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Hence their importance and the broad interest attached to them.

Tens of thousands of workers are engaged in the management of Yugoslav economic enterprises. Recent days have seen the consultation of the managing boards, and directors of different undertakings according to industrial branches.

Parallely with the above, the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee of Trade Unions was also held. Both the consultations and the Plenum are characteristic and important for the internal life and development of the new Yugoslavia. The consultations by virtue of having for the first time, after 3 to 4 months' practical management of enterprises, brought together the workers-managers from all parts of the country to compare notes, review the successes and weak points of their activities and to lay down plans for their future work. The Plenum placed into the centre of attention the question of the role and place of the trade unions in the building of socialism, more specifically in relation to Workers' Councils and Managing Boards.

These are the initial steps of the complex revolutionary process of conversion of direct producers into managers of economy and — in the last analysis — of the state itself. New legislation concerning economic enterprises and a new financial system are being worked out by the Yugoslav Government. Both are due to be adapted to the basic goal, i. e. the taking over of factories by the workers and the acceleration of the process of incorporation of workingmen in their management. Under the new financial system, the workers of a factory share in the distribution of their surplus work. The practical meaning of this is that they take part in the determination of their wages. In the Soviet Union and the Cominform countries the workers' wages are fixed behind the backs of the working class, without the latter's participation and control. They are decided by a bureaucratic caste which is beyond control and which itself disposes of the surpluses. And the measure of personal freedom — in the last analysis — is determined by the degree in which the people have a deciding voice in the disposal of the surplus products of their labour.

The working class of Yugoslavia is proceeding to grapple in practice with the difficulties necessarily imposed by the revolutionary path it treads. It is already scoring its first feats along that path.

The Management Board of the "Impol" factory, in Slovenia, is rightly proud of the results accomplished by it. It largely consists of machine operators (three-quarters of the board members must come from the workers' ranks under the law). It is a fact that they are still insufficiently familiar with such professional matters like accounting, the various operations requiring a specialized knowledge of chemistry, physics, etc. But then the factory possesses its experts for such jobs. The Managing Board has proceeded to subject to minute analysis the entire mechanism of the work organization, it has detected the weak spots and posed concrete tasks both before the experts and the individual departments

of the factory. The Managing Board of the "Rade Končar" factory, on the other hand, subsequent to a study of its enterprise, found that the tool shop was undeveloped and inadequate to meet the enterprise's requirements. Tangible conclusions and the assignments given to the technical staff resulted in the construction of a new tool shop which has infused new life to the smooth running of the factory. Many are the examples of creative ability and initiative on the part of the workers engaged in managing the enterprises. Practical experience shows that the transfer of factories to the workers has fostered the zeal, enthusiasm and the forces of the working class, although there still exists a certain amount of wandering, exploration and apprehension at the magnitude and importance of the task.

The 13th Plenum of Trade Unions, held in Belgrade on November 15 and 16, discussed precisely the rôle facing the trade unions in the new conditions of Yugoslav practice, and how to assist the working class to raise its cultural and professional level as rapidly as possible in order to meet the great tasks at hand and those that lie ahead.

The Central Committee of the Trade Unions, acting in conjunction with the Yugoslav Council for Science and Culture and the republican ministries of education, drafted and submitted to the Plenum a new schedule for the general education of workers. The proposed system would be put into effect in the form of a law. It envisages three grades of general education of workers.

A preparatory and educational curriculum would serve to familiarize workers with the basic elements of mathematics, history, and geography of Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

A basic educational course would provide workers with a more solid knowledge of natural science, their native tongue, geography and history of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and it would last nine to ten months.

A school of general education would have a two-year curriculum, and would cover the subjects and enjoy the status of the lower high-school.

The first two courses would be organized and financed by trade union organizations, whereas the school of general education would be sponsored by the state like any normal school in the educational system of the country.

The Plenum especially insisted on elucidating the rôle of trade union organizations in conditions where the workers themselves manage the enterprises and where they are gradually to take over the management of the entire economy. The trade union organizations are due to help the Workers' Councils and Managing Boards, and, which is particularly vital, to engage in a full-scale cultural, educational and ideological-political drive for the enlightening of the working class.

All these efforts aspire toward the assisting and accelerating of the revolutionary course of consistent application of the teachings of Marx and Engels in Yugoslav practice. It is understandable, therefore, why the Cominform circles and their followers in the Western countries should fear Yugoslav practice and have only words of abuse for it. On the other hand however, the efforts of Yugoslavia are meeting with true sympathies and interest of all the progressive peoples in the world, and primarily among workers.

R. VUJOVIC

EFFECT PRECEDES CAUSE BY FIVE MONTHS

HARD IS THE STRUGGLE being waged by the leadership of the World Congress for Defense of Peace because its enemies are so stubborn.

In its long fight to show the world that only the atom bomb is a danger to peace, and that the expansionistic tendencies of the USSR serve the cause of peace, one of its powerful enemies has been the Soviet Government which caused an upheaval in Korea without use of the atom bomb, simply by its political moves. And in another struggle which is being waged parallel with the first, these unfortunate leaders have another equally hard-headed enemy — the chronology of events. The executives of the World Congress for Defense of Peace are on a war footing in a big way — with the calendar.

Certain episodes from this unequal struggle are rather well-known. They are the ones connected with the preparations for the Peace Congress in Sheffield that did not come off. Arrangements in various countries were made for the election of delegates to this Congress — free elections of course. Everything in connection with the elections was going as smoothly as apple pie except for the fact that the calendar balked and would not allow itself to be tamed down and put in order. And so it happened that the delegates in Austria were elected on October 21, while on October 5 the British Government already had in its hands, in the form of application for visas, the complete list of these delegates who were freely elected 16 days later. In Hungary, the delegates were elected November 4, while 12 days earlier, on October 23, the complete list of these delegates was already in London. A commentator on the London radio was able to play the role of prophet on November 3 and inform his Hungarian listeners the exact names of all 20 delegates who were to be

elected on the morrow in the free elections.

But, as we have said, these are well-known episodes. Less well-known is the struggle with the calendar which went on in connection with the expelling of Yugoslavia from the World Congress of Defenders of Peace. We learned about this from the reports on the press conference which the organizers of the Sheffield Congress held November 3 in London. At this conference, one of these organizers, named Ivor Montague, answering the question as to why the Yugoslavs had been evicted from the "world movement for peace", gave the following answer in the desire to prove that it was not true that the Yugoslavs had been thrown out for the simple reason that such an order had come from the Soviet Union: "We expelled the Yugoslavs because they are supporting the policy of their Government which is persecuting those who signed the Stockholm Appeal in Yugoslavia."

In this statement there are two things that are true, one that is untrue and one that is impossible. The true things are as follows: first, that the Yugoslavs support the policy of their Government and, second, that the Yugoslavs were expelled from the World Congress of Defenders of Peace because they support the policy of their Government; it is untrue that there were any people in Yugoslavia who signed the Stockholm Appeal; and it is impossible for the Yugoslav Government to persecute people who do not exist. And the whole thing adds up to a war with the calendar.

The Yugoslavs were evicted from the World Congress of Defenders of Peace because of their negative stand toward the Stockholm Appeal — says the leadership of that Congress through one of its members, Ivor Montague. And here is what the calendar says: the expulsion of Yugoslavia (the consequence of its disagreement with the Stock-

holm Appeal) was carried out on October 18, 1949, while the Stockholm Appeal (that is, the proclamation that was the cause of the disagreement, and, therefore, of the expulsion of the Yugoslavs) was adopted at the Congress in Stockholm which was held from March 15 to 19, 1950. That means, as the stubborn calendar bears witness, that the effect preceded the cause by a full five months.

THE SHEFFIELD CONGRESS, as we know, was transformed into the Warsaw Congress. This was decided by the leadership of the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace, as a sign of protest because the British Government did not issue entry visas to a large number of delegates.

A storm of protest followed this act by the British Government. The most vehement in uttering their indignation were the "defenders of peace" in Prague. The whole Prague press devoted columns and columns of space to this case, branding the "warfare by means of non-issuance of visas" as something extremely uncivilized, unpacific and base.

The indignation of the Prague Cominformists is a favorable sign. It shows that there has been a change of mind in the last fourteen months, a change for the better. Because the following happened in Prague in September last year:

The Executive Committee of the International Journalists' Organization was sitting in Prague at that time. The session was attended by delegates from many states, but not all of them. For instance, the Yugoslav representative in the Executive Committee was not present — because the Czechoslovak Government had not issued him an entry visa. The Czechoslovak secretariat of the International Journalists' Organization did not answer the telegram of protest sent by the Yugoslav representative. When the

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA

Yugoslav Newspapermen's Association authorized one of its members residing in Prague to represent it at the session, he was forcibly prevented from entering the hall in which the session was being held.

That is why the present stand of the Prague Cominformists on the question of issuance or non-issuance of visas gives rise to great hopes. They are obviously progressing in their conceptions. Fourteen months ago, there was not even one single voice of protest in all Czechoslovakia against the "warfare by means of non-issuance of visas" being waged by the Prague Government. Today the whole Czechoslovak press is thundering against a similar war being waged by another Government. Who knows, maybe in the fourteen coming months, on the occasion of some sort of international congress in Prague, even the Prague Government itself will give the world a pleasant surprise by issuing visas to all foreign delegates without exception?

THE FIRST DAY OF THE CONGRESS IN WARSAW is also a source of new hope. Judging from the address delivered on that day by the President of the World Congress of Defenders of Peace, Mr. Joliot-Curie, the leadership of that organization is following the same course taken by the Czechoslovak public: the course of correcting their viewpoint on certain matters.

I am thinking here not only of the condemnation of "warfare by means of non-issuance of visas". This matter is much more serious than that and much more far-reaching. The point is that the stand of the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace seems to be changing fundamentally on various questions.

Certain alterations (or rather additions) were already hinted at: after the speeches by Tihonov, Ehrenburg, and other Soviet members of the leadership of the Peace Movement, in which they condemned all aggression and war propaganda, it was clear that the non-Soviet members of that leadership had adopted their opinion. But there are bold changes in that stand which

we did not expect. Two of the changes are so bold that it is still not clear to us if they are the fruit of extensive consultation or if Joliot-Curie announced them on his own carelessly trespassing over the boundaries set up by the Cominformists for development of the struggle for their kind of "peace".

First of all, Mr. Joliot-Curie stated on behalf of the whole organization: "We have no intention of imposing a government of our choice on any country." This statement is sensational, because if the World Congress for Peace were to adopt the viewpoint of its President, it would be passing sentence on the policy of the Cominform which has been directing the main part of its activities for the last two years toward the provocation of a coup d'etat in one country — Yugoslavia, toward changing its leadership and imposing on it some government of its own choice.

The second statement made by Mr. Joliot-Curie was equally sensational: he said that the Congress would condemn all economic discrimination. If the Congress condemns all such discrimination, it will also thereby condemn that total, almost hermetically-sealed blockade which the Cominform countries have been applying to Yugoslavia for over two years.

If these two things should be condemned, that would mean that the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace had emancipated itself from service to the policy of one power, the Soviet Union, and that it had really begun to serve peace.

Hopes are fine things. But the Warsaw Congress has still not drawn to a close. And we know that the first day of all these congresses of "peace" — is a day of words. The deeds come later. So far, they have differed from the words. Dare we now believe that such positive changes have already taken place within the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace that the Congress, realizing the two fine promises of its President, will even reject the foundations of Cominform policy: discrepancy between words and deeds?

ALBANIAN ECONOMIC POLICY, according to the Warsaw radio, is achieving great results. "The prosperity of the Albanian people is rising", broadcasts Radio Warsaw.

After this, one might expect such an assertion to be followed by statistics showing that the Albanian people are living better, eating better and dressing better. But no such data are given by the Radio Warsaw reporter. He does give some figures, true enough, but these figures refer to something else. "In comparison with 1945", he says, "there is 4 times more oil being produced, 5 times more coal, 11 times more bitumen, considerably more cement..." and there the tale ends.

The figures are fine. But they only show that — Albanian exports to the Soviet Union are growing. These augmented exports do, admittedly, contribute to someone's prosperity — but that someone is in the USSR. Perhaps there is someone here and there in Albania getting more prosperous, too. But — what is the relationship between the growth of exports and the growth of the prosperity of the Albanian people? The Radio Warsaw reporter probably knows. But precisely because he does know, he would rather omit the figures on the increase of the people's prosperity and restrict his comments to the figures on the increase of — production for the needs of the "leading state."

D. T.

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